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Introduction. 
ln lndonesia a double phenomenon can be observed with progressive changes in 
land-tenure and land-use linked with the striking increase in the number of tree-
crops , in particular rubber and oil palm , in the " outer islands " (Mainly Sumatra and 
Kal imantan) . 
The coherence, previously and progressively maintained between technical and 
social systems, favoured a stable social background and the permanence of agro-
forestry practices for rubber, which had proven reliable, as well as the development 
of typical monocultures such as oil palm , which appeared as new " crop 
opportun ities ". A significant increase in perennial crops in the long term (rubber 
since its introduction at the beginning of the 20th century) as well as in the short term 
(more recently the introduction of oil palm) and changes in bath stakeholders and 
production systems (Estates and smallholders) are factors that significantly affect 
bath land-use and land legislation (or tenure) in these islands. This paper looks at 
the factors that trigger changes such as these. 
1. Land tenure as a tool for change. 
1.1 Changes in traditional land legislation (adat). 
The individualisation of farmers ' behaviour with regard to land property and contrai 
has resulted in a progressive decrease in collective land management that has been 
observed over a period of many years. ln tact, from land that was initially communal 
and traditionally managed with shifting cultivation , the situation is now progressively 
moving towards more individual management through the introduction and increase 
in tree-crop based farming systems. The first tree-crop was rubber with the 
development of an extensive rubber based agro-forestry system called the "jungle 
rubber" system. The formerly applied " right of use " which traditionally applied in the 
case of tree-crops has changed into to a kind of " private property " very close to that 
practiced in western countries. This phenomenon parallels a similar trend in 
traditional legislation or customary law (Adat) during the last century based on 
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" rights of user" towards "private praperty " (Durand , 2000). The two main 
stakeholders involved in these changes are the State and farmers. There are also 
two types of opposing land legislation : the official legislation and traditional legislation 
(Adat). Before trying to understand these changes, it was necessary to identify the 
principal characteristics of the local land-tenure and legal legislation 1. 
1.2 Origins of official land legislation: the contrai of 74 % of lndonesia by the 
State. 
The pre-eminence of a central governmental authority over land, land ownersh ip and 
land use is a historical phenomenon in lndonesia that dates from the former large 
central kingdoms in the 15th to the 1 yth centuries and has continued in our era. The 
colonial authorities took over land-tenure fram the Rajahs (Malayan sultanates) and 
various indianized Empires and kept contrai of the land while continuing to grant a 
" right of use" to local populations according to the local custom. An agrarian law (" 
the agrarian act ") was voted in 1870 by the colonial government that guaranteed 
traditional rights (Adat) to farmers on permanently cultivated land. Enforcement of 
this law was theoretically limited to the islands of Java and Madura (Durand , 1999). 
This law also specified that ail virgin lands, including fallow, remained under the 
contrai of the State that retained the right to decide on its final use (and consequently 
on its final users whether public or private). This type of top-bottom appraach was 
the cause of all the land conflicts that subsequently occurred, in particular between 
the State and individual farmers relying on slash and burn agriculture. ln this case, 
fallows were considered by the government to be " virgin " territory and could be 
handed over to companies so that timber could be cleared and plantations 
established (concessions) , or for development prajects such as transmigration . 
However it is necessary to note the fuzziness of the exact legal definition of official 
land tenure. The 1945 constitution (still in force) declares that "land (..) is controlled 
by the State for a greater prosperity of the people ". As recalled by Durand, the 
wording states " forests are therefore not nationalised (Durand 2000) . After 
independence, the lndonesian government took over this law. Ali presumed forested 
land was thus placed under State authority, which implies 74 % of lndonesian land is 
under the authority of the Ministry of forestry. The actual forest potential of the 
country is far lower and stood at 66 million hectares in 1998 (Durand 1999), i.e. 35 % 
of the total surface area of the country. lt was necessary to wait for a decree in 1972 
that officially confirmed that this land belonged to the state. ln the absence of any 
claim , the State implicitly recognises the traditional law (which was not the case of 
the 1870 law). The 1972 decree allowed the State to pravide land for private or 
public concessions, including HTI (semi-public forestry prajects) and various 
development projects (NES2 for example). The local communities were no longer 
allowed to manage forestland and were obliged to recognise land rights accorded by 
the State. 
Originally, two types of tenure were used for colonists (Private Estates): i) the 
emphyteutic lease in areas under direct administrative contrai and ii) the concession 
in autonomous areas [Collet, 1925 #94]. The duration was generally 75 years but it 
was extended to 125 years for perennial crops. ln autonomous areas, 
1 The main sources are Dove (1985), Geertz (1966), Holleman (1981) and Durand (1998). 
2 NES = Nucleus Smallholder Estates Schemes. 
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concessions were granted only in zones where local communities did not exert, 
or had given up, their traditional rights. The principle of the concession still exists 
today in the case of forest concessions (over 30 years) as well as in the case of tree 
plantations owned by private companies (Acacia mangium mainly) or perennial crops 
(oil palm) . 
1.3 The legal basis of the existing law 
ln 1960 the" basic agrarian laws" (Undang2 Pokok Agraria) were passed which laid 
down the main principles of the new agrarian ri~hts and , for the first time, there was 
formai recognition of the traditional rights (Adat ). This law was supposed to remove 
the legal dualism on land-tenure that had existed since colonial times and abolish the 
priority of the State over land-use (tanah negara). ln reality, the formai recognition of 
Adat rights of local communities is still subordinated to State interests at the national 
level. The government can always make use of this land , provided there is a statute 
of high national priority. The right of the State over tanah negara was recognised and 
confirmed by the " Basic Act one Forestry " passed in 1967, which spelled out forest 
exploitation regulations. 
The decentralisation laws passed in the late 1990s simply transferred the decision-
making centre from the national to the provincial level under the authority of the 
governors and especially of the "Buppati in charge at district level (Kabupaten) . ln 
practice, the law did not change anything and still does not protect the fallow lands 
from possible appropriation by the State. 
ln reality , institutions and particularly development projects consistently argue in the 
name of national interests, without justifying their arguments in order to avoid having 
to take local interests into account. Generally, they do not distinguish between " right 
of ownership " and " right of use ". The first is not recognised in the absence of a land 
register or land certificates (except for NES project) . The latter, the " traditional " 
right , is only tolerated by default or in the case of the non-use of land (Dave 1985). 
The confusion between the various types of rights theoretically recognised by "Adat " 
was already latent in the colonial regulation (Holleman 1981 ). 
The 1960 law was not so clear. ln the 1970s, the State used its rights over tanah 
negara to plan transmigration and various development projects. NES projects, 
forestry projects (semi-public joint venture companies called " HTI ", Hutan Tanaman 
/ndustn) and concessions for plantation companies flourished . The 1990s saw an 
acceleration of this trend , particularly in some provinces such as West-Kalimantan 
(Geissler, 1999), Riau (Angelsen , 1995) and Jambi (Stole, 1997). 
3 lt also implies that there might be differences between local adats , between local customary laws 
depending on the tribe. 
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Frame 1: The" Adat" (customary law) in West-Kalimantan 
Dayaks Kantus recognises 2 distinct rights: 
A - the " right of ownership " of land (hak milik), including land under fallow, 
provided that this land is cultivated (including land in shifting agriculture). This 
right, which is in tact a " right of user 11 is the " property " of a clan or a fam ily that 
belongs to the community and lives in a traditional "long house" (Rumah 
panjang), where up to 50 families can reside. 
B - the 11 right of user" (" right of avail " or hak ulayat (Dove, 1985) is the residual 
right of families or clans who have left the long-house but conserve, in theory, a " 
right of return ". 
The disappearance of longhouses in the 1960s and 70s, under the pretext of 
modernisation (as a fire-prevention policy) decided by local authorities (of Javanese 
inspiration) led to a shift in the traditional regulation, (Adat) with a redefinition of the 
four following rights: 
1 - a "temporary right of individual use" of cultivated land linked to Jadang 
activities (shifting agriculture). Fallow land is decreasing. The community contrais 
fallow land and its use: the decisions are made by original land leaders in 
agreement with " original clans", known as founders of the village. They reta in a 
right of pre-eminence over land use, which remains theoretically indivisible. 
2 - a "right of permanent use" related to the presence of tree-crops (perennial 
plantations). This right lasts as long as land is cropped and harvested . lt is 
typically the case of "jungle rubber" and monoculture plantations. This right is 
transmissible and, in tact, gradually changes into a right equivalent to "private 
property ", in particular after several replantings under the jungle rubber system. 
3 - a "right of restricted use" on Community farmed land or for certain trees 
(including those located on "private land": in particular in some tembawangs (fruit 
and timber based permanent agro-forests) . This right grants only the right of 
harvest to satisfy a family's needs but in no case can be a source of 
incarne through sales outside or even inside the village. These resources remain 
community based . 
4 - "right of ownership": for house, garden and , more recently, for perennial 
plantations such as rubber or oil palm. This results in the total disappearance of 
the " rights of user " of the former users. The ground is declared tanah mati, or " 
dead land 11 which leads to the recognition of only one owner: the current and real 
user. Such a right is close to real ownership under western law. The community 
still has a right to such land in the sense that land is theoretically not saleable to 
people outside the community. This is now changing with the emergence of a 
land market and demand coming from Javanese migrants. ln some villages, in 
the vicinity of transmigration projects, land transactions appear to reflect a 
change in Adat. Problems persist in connection with land purchased by migrants. 
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1.4 Adaptation of the customary law to tree-crops: long-term perspective. 
The State recognises the pre-eminence of Adat for land provided the government 
does not claim rights to the land. The traditional land-tenure is characterised by the 
possession of land on an undivided basis (with the exception of house and garden, 
Pekarangan) by the village community4. The right of user is based on the actual use 
of land for farming. Local differences exist between Sumatra and Kalimantan on the 
one hand, and between traditional zones and those that are enjoying full economic 
development on the other. Change occurs rapidly, and there is a real adaptation of 
social systems to new production conditions (also through specialisation in perennial 
crops) with more individualisation of the decision-making process and farming 
activities. Tree-crops only require intensive labour at planting but not for harvesting at 
least for rubber and oil palm, i.e. once a year, which is not the case in shifting 
cultivation for instance5. As tree-crops require long-term strategies, the " right of 
user " to the land is moving towards private property. The recognition of a long-term 
right to plantation land (tree-crops) , is gradually becoming a right of ownership, and 
this is also a significant factor in the permanence of agro-forestry practices linked 
with rubber. Historically, this trend facilitates the extension of this type of system. 
1.5 The case of West-Kalimantan (District of Sanggau and Sintang). 
The local land rights "adat" are detailed in frame 1 (Momberg, 1993 and Dove, 
1985). Shifting agriculture requires contrai of labour at certain critical periods. Fallow 
land cropped in upland rice is regrouped and cleared . lt is a system with a short 
annual cycle. ln this particular case, under Adat, land remains undivided. Jungle 
rubber requires a long cycle (at least 35 years or even longer). lt does not require 
collective contrai of labour. lt is adapted to family agriculture with relatively individual 
management. The Adat generally protects the rights of plantation (" rights of user " to 
the productive trees as long as they are harvested). This guarantees protection of 
the farmer's investment. 
After several generations, this " right of user " is changing into a right equivalent to 
private property; as the land has not been controlled by the community for several 
decades. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of social organisation in West-
Kalimantan . Technical constraints and the move to individual decision-making (in the 
case of jungle rubber and other tree-crops) has led to an adaptation of the land 
system, which is an integral part of the social system. Technical innovation and the 
development of a significant family plantation sector have fundamentally changed 
land use and consequently land tenure. 
4 The village community might in some cases be restricted to the famil ies that founded the village. 
5 Of course, tree -crop plantation is labour intensive, but after planting , harvesting and weeding labour 
requi rements are spread throughout the year (in the case of rubber and oil palm). 
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T bl 1 Eh . a e t mcan d • 1 soc1a oraamsation in West-Kalimantan 
Dayak Bidayuh Malayus Java 
Basic economic unit Nuclear family Nuclear familv Nuclear familv 
Basic group unit Kelompok petani Kelompok petani Kelompok petani 
Collective working groups & 
" turun " (familv arouosl 
Primarv territorial unit Villaae Villaae Villaae 
Second territorial unit Transmigration project 
Group linkage Tribes Sultanate (formerly) Javanese origin 
l<orovince & villaael 
Statute local (as/1) local fas/J) Miarant 
Main social lndividualism High social coherence. 
characteristics relative equity between Collective decisions take 
people precedence over individual 
choices 
Link with hierarchy Democratic, individualised Pyramidal society 
Land-tenure and Adat complex: indivision ditto Private property with land 
(communal) and tilles issued by 
quasi private property transmigration projects 
deoendina on croos. 
Housing Collective: formerly " long Family units Family units 
house ", now disappearing. 
Privatisation of housina. 
2 Land: a resource that became rare in late 1990s 
2.1: An emerging land market. 
Land has not been a limiting factor for local populations in pioneer zones for 
decades. Land was plentiful at the beginning of the last century with an average of 3 
inhabitants /km2 in Sumatra and Kalimantan. ln the 1990s, the development of large 
concessions by private companies for perennial or forestry plantations began to 
change the picture. lndependently of this trend , transmigrants, either spontaneous or 
in projects, and generally Javanese, consistently sought to acquire land to increase 
their very limited initial plots (generally 2 to 2,5 ha in transmigration areas). This trend 
was clearly accentuated in the middle of the 1990s in the case of NES farmers who 
began to profit from the accumulation of capital from their rubber or oil palm 
plantations. 
A SRAP survey made in 1997 provides a preliminary indication of this emerging land 
market (table 2) . The sale of land by local communities with the agreement of land 
chiefs confirms the changes in Adat with respect to the individualisation of 
behaviours. Today tree-crop plantations with a quasi " permanent private tenure 
property " allow sales to third parties or to non-residents of the village (something 
which was impossible under land indivision). This recent phenomenon is still limited 
but is tending to increase around centres of transmigration. The tact that rubber and 
oil palm projects required local farmers to regroup their land into 25-hectare blacks of 
contiguous land also contributed to voluntary land regrouping and consequently to 
the individualisation of land backed by local Adat. The exchange of plots , even if 
limited, could thus occur between farmers in the same village, thereby recogn ising 
effective contrai and property rights not only to trees but also to the land itself. The 
emerging land market also increases land security for producers, even t~ough no 
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land certificates are available as these are neither provided by governmental 
agencies nor privately. The logic of land acquisition through tree-crops such as 
jungle rubber is also reinforced (Penot, E. 2001 ). 
Table 2: prices of land in West-Kalimantan (1997) 
s ource: E Penot PH Courbet 1997. Œxchanae rate for 1 US $ in 1997: 2400) 
Tribe of the buyer Village Type of land Price in Price in US 
Ro $ (1997) 
Dayak Engkayu Non productive jungle 170 000 71 
rubber 
Dayak Engkayu Productive jungle rubber 250 000 104 
Dayak Engkayu Lowlands, swampy areas 15 000 6 
Dayak Lape Lowland rainfed rice 1 200 000 500 
Dayak Bali Jungle rubber 150 000 63 
Dayak Bali Oil palm 9 000 000 3750 
Javanese Trimulia Ladang, upland rice 800 000 334 
Javanese Trimulia Jungle rubber 400 000 167 
Javanese Trimulia Lowland rainfed rice 950 000 396 
Javanese Trimulia Lowland rainfed rice 2 000 000 834 
Javanese Trimulia Lowland rainfed rice 1 400 000 584 
Javanese Trimulia Lowland rainfed rice 500 000 208 
Javanese Trimulia Jungle rubber 1 200 000 500 
Javanese Pariban Baru Old jungle rubber 500 000 208 
The price of land depends on land-se (crops or fallow) and ease of access to roads 
and markets. lt also depends to a large extent on actual land availability in each 
village. The still very recent land market can provide only indications of purchases 
(with 1997 prices). However, other factors play a raie in land price generation. The 
first is connected with the purchase of land from Javanese transmigrants who 
generally favour sawah land (for the cultivation of irrigated rice). Overall, the price of 
land purchased by transmigrants is two to six times higher (4 to 800 000 Rp/ha) than 
of that purchased by private companies in the Dayak area (150 to 250 000 Rp/ha) . 
Dayaks only very occasionally buy sawah land6 . Sawah land has a rather higher 
commercial value than ladang areas with an average price ratio from 1 to 5. There is 
a certain amount of price speculation due to the scarcity of sawah land. For cash 
crops, the purchase price of a plot with oil palm trees is very high and comparable 
with that of a clonai rubber plantation. Such "plantations" are rarely sold except in 
transmigration areas where some Javanese buy plantations from planters who quit 
the scheme. 
6 Historically and culturally, Javanese farmers are used to sawah (intensified irrigated rice). Dayak farmers are 
more used to rainfed lowland rice cultivation (far less intensified). 
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2.2 Land use changes in West-Kalimantan province. 
Changes in land-use in this selected pilot zone are highly representative of the major 
"tree-crops belts" in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The large-scale adoption of tree-
crops by smallholders in tact favours land privatisation in the long term and 
generates a shift in local customary law as well as in some major factors such as 
labour organisation and land tenure. Table 4 shows the main cropping systems in 
West-Kalimantan and the social organisation lin_ked with these cropping systems 
Table 4: Main croooinQ svstems an d socra organisa ron rn a rman . 1 . f . Kr ta n. 
Topics Sa go Shifting Jungle rubber Clonal rubber Oil palm 
extractivism cultivation plantations 
<19the 19th century 1910·> 2001 Smallholding 1995-1997- > 
centurv 1973->2001 2001 
Land-tenure territorial Indivision lndividualised Private property Private property 
Type of society migrant semi-migrant Settled settled Settled 
Organisation of individual or Collective lndividual individual individual, 
labour collective organised , re-
use of collective 
Use of collective yes Yes Partial for no Yes 
working groups annual crops 
(Gotona Rovona! (lst vear) 
Type of exchange Global Strict reciprocity Strict 
---
For harvest 
between users collective reciprocity only 
aooroach 
Share-cropping no No Yes possible, rare No 
Use of external No No No yes yes 
labour cessible cessible 
Cultural reference Not known High Law low No one 
linked ta the 
oroduct 
Level of crop zero Law Average high High 
soecialisation 
Evolution for disappearin More and lncreasing in increasing Recent 
West-Kalimantan g more limited pionneer increase 
zones zones 
Tribs in Melanaus Kan tus Bidayuh Bidayuh Bidayuh 
Kalimantan lban Javanais Javanais 
The community has generally ratified these changes through the recogn ition of 
ownership by families of land cultivated with perennial species such as rubber or 
more recently oil palm. Sometimes, originally undivided land for ladang (rainfed 
agriculture) has been divided into plots for several families who wanted to join an oil 
palm scheme with a private company. This individualisation in terms of farming 
strategy and land-use is also a process of land securement, which contributes to 
current plantation dynamics Uungle rubber, clonal rubber or oil palm). To security - in 
terms of incarne as well as system sustainability - can be added a third component : 
land security. 
From the 1980s on , various stakeholders (State, private companies, local 
communities: Dayaks or transmigrated Javanese populations) developed strategies 
that led to a new definition of land-tenure with respect to the search for land security. 
Government policy for plantation concessions (oil palm and Acacia mangium) led to 
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a legal redistribution of land to private companies to the detriment of local 
populations. This type of policy is linked to new crop opportunities, which proved to 
be extremely attractive in the lndonesian context (plentiful land , low cost of labour ... ) 
as well as in the international context (good prices until 1997, and still attractive for 
oil palm in 2002). The size of Estate concessions varies between 10 000 and 300 
000 hectares. The actual planted areas each concession generally lies between 3 
000 and 20 000 hectares (around 10 % of total concession land for forestry 
plantations and 20 % for oil palm plantations in Kabupaten Sanggau (Geissler & 
Penot, 2000) . These tree-crops contribute to a new definition of the landscape. 
This type of land-use policy can also lead to conflicts with local communities , when 
land that is apparently without an owner (especially on maps), but which in tact 
belongs to a specific village community is allocated to projects or private plantations. 
lt should be noted that local populations are generally not informed of legal changes 
in land tenure or rights . One then observes two different worlds with two different 
logics that are not understood by those involved because their spatial perception is 
not the same. One world is ancestral and based on Adat, i.e. the tradition , and the 
other one belongs to the " legal and official world" . 
The 1967 forestry law recognises the rights of local populations to forest resources 
(Momberg 1993). This situation may also be a potential source of conflict in the very 
near future . ln 1998 local communities legally controlled only 29 % of the district (as 
oppose to 52 % in 1985). ln West-Kalimantan, in the district of Sanggau there was a 
very rapid and striking increase in the number of forest concessions (" HTI " with 
Acacia mangium) and oil palm plantations. This district, which is located in the centre 
of Kapuas basin , is representative of recent trends and presently has the highest rate 
of deforestation and of degraded land in the province. 
ln 1998, the SRAP research project (CIRAD/ICRAF) launched a pilot study (Yan 
Desjeux, ENITA) , followed in 1999 by a complete cartographie study using a GIS 
{Cathy Geissler, University of Nice) The objective was the quantitative and qualitative 
measurement of the phenomenon of land transfer to concessions and its impact on 
the local population (Geissler 1999). The total Sanggau district covers an area of 1 
845 000 hectares. The forest has long been a significant resource for local 
populations. Land-use in the Sanggau area has changed considerably, and there 
has been a clear acceleration in these changes in the last decade. Map 2 shows 
land use in 1998 (cf study area in map 1) . Three main types of land-use can be 
distinguished : forest , agricultural activity and concessions for plantations (map 2). 
At the beginning of the last century, forest covered practically the whole area as 
witnessed in many reports by travellers. At the beginning of the 1980s, forest still 
covered nearly 40 % of the area. At the present time, only a few vestiges of this 
primary forest (approximately 7.5 % of the district) remain and forested areas appear 
like a mosaic of small plots in mountainous and isolated zones above 500 meters 
AGL (map 3) . The introduction of jungle rubber at the beginning of last century 
allowed Dayak agriculture, which was formerly based on the harvesting of forest 
products and slash and burn agriculture, to become sedentary. Rubber plantations 
now caver 463 000 ha in the province, including 97,2 % under jungle rubber (DGE, 
1998). 
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Smallholders thus can be considered as a contributing factor to deforestation , 
although deforestation has been very progressive and spread out over one century. 
lt is not possible to accurately map jungle rubber plantations on remote sensing 
images because they cannot be differentiated from secondary forests or fallow. They 
make up a mosaic of plantations mainly located in a radius of 10 km around the 
villages. From the 1950s on, forestry companies obtained concessions for timber 
exploitation under a particular regulation that specified selective cutting only. This 
regulation theoretically allows sustainable exploitation of the forest in 
"production forests " which enjoy a special status. ln practice, non-respect of the 
regulations leading to over-exploitation means these companies are largely 
responsible for deforestation (Gouyon , 1999). Smallholders were long considered the 
ideal scapegoat. ln fact the forest management regulation called " TPI " in 1972 
(whose name was changed to " TPTI " in 1989), was for all practical purposes not 
applied by private Estates (Cossalter, 1992), (Durand 1999). The process of 
deforestation was then amplified by plantation Estates (Patter L. , 1998) and 
worsened in 1997, the year of the " El nino" phenomenon, when major forest fires 
occurred (Laumonier Y., 1998). 
The recomputed areas in the developed GIS (Geographical Information System 
using Mapinfo software), carried out for each recomposed layer, are presented in 
table 3. 
Table 3: Land-use distribution in Kabupaten Sanggau, from SRAP-GIS in 1995. 
Different layers of the GIS Areas in ha Distribution 
"forest" 
Real roduction forest 
Source : C Geissler, 1999. 
The production forest areas represent only 14 % of the Kabupaten territory (as 
oppose to more than 40 % before 1980). These areas are located at the periphery of 
the district. The zones with smallholder agricultural activity under adat only represent 
14 % of the district instead of 52 % before implementation of the concessions policy 
(including the forest zones which remain traditionally under adat) . These agricultural 
areas are located in the most populated sectors near main communication axes 
(roads and rivers) (map 6). Transmigration projects represent only 2.8 % of the 
district. Concessions for perennial and forest plantations industrial now caver 60 % of 
the district of Sanggau (map 4 oil palm concessions and map 5 HTI) . They are 
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also mainly located close to the most populated areas with abundant labour and 
easy access. 
The complete series of layers is shown in map 2. Maps 4 & 5 show zones with 
official production forests and zones with concessions for forest plantation (HTI) and 
tree-crop plantations. Land officially remaining for the Dayak populations is thus 
extremely reduced . Map 6 shows the total area under agricultural activity. Map 7 is a 
simulation of the " average scenario " where Estate plantations continue to develop 
but not at an exponential rate as was the case before 19987. Sorne regulation by the 
State through limitation of the number of concessions combined with the financial 
crisis (1997-2001) leads to a scenario that seems more probable in 2002 (Geissler 
1999). Nevertheless, around 201 O; a large proportion of the land currently occupied 
by local rural populations will be planted by Estates including more than 45 % by oil 
palm companies . Less and less land will thus be available for local populations, who 
do not hold any land titles. This trend implies a significant risk of land conflict 
between smallholders and Estates in the very near future. 
3 Smallholder strategies and reaction. 
With very limited capital and land still plentiful, local farmers share their land 
resource with Estates on a basis which seems to be quite unfair. Beside a full credit 
for plantation establishment (with relatively obscure rates) , farmers get 2 hectares 
planted with oil palm from the 7.5 hectares they provide to the Estate. 
Under this type of policy, pressure has begun to increase significantly on land 
controlled by local communities, leading to situations where the introduction of new 
crops is no longer possible. Farmers' sons have to leave the village, despite the tact 
that intensification is tending to replace current extensive farming systems to 
increase productivity on the remaining available land. This strategy, based on oil 
palm adoption irrespective of the conditions, as well as the development of off-farm 
incarnes linked with Estates, are short-term strategies. The decrease in available 
land , which in some areas is already nil , will result in a mechanism of rural migration 
in the next generation . ln the long term, it may well lead to destabilisation, or even a 
certain degree of de-structuration of local populations. ln reality, in 1998 the situation 
was less alarming because the concessions are only partially planted: an average of 
20 % for oil palm Estates and 10 % for HTI planted with Acacia mangium. 
Consequently, in theory, 54 % of the Kabupaten area is still available for agricultural 
use by local communities, although these communities have no real legal rights. 
Thus the legal situation is a real source of potential conflict; however this statement 
needs to be moderated to take into account real land-use. There is a clear difference 
between the legal situation, which could be extremely sensitive politically if local 
populations realised what is currently happening, and reality in terms of land use. 
Local populations still have the impression they contrai their " village territory " 
through Adat. And in fact, Estates do negotiate with the local communities the use of 
land that has been allocated to them as a concession. However, in theory, the 
Estates could use ail available land within the concessions and thus create a 
situation of conflict particularly in the most heavily populated areas. 
7 The first scenario is that of the continuation of the 1997 pre-crisis trend. The last scenario is that of a very 
strong limitation in plantation extension. 
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Government decisions made on land-use since 2000 and potential reforms can be 
expected to limit the pressure on local communities. The development of tree-crops 
and forestry plantations create local employment opportunities in the short term as 
well as a better road system and thus easier access to markets. Private oil palm 
Estates in particular have continued a policy of smallholder plantations that was 
formerly implemented by governmental sectorial projects (these ended in 2000). 
However, the communities do not have access to reliable information on the real 
legal threat to their land. Ultimately, the logic of private Estates is in opposition to the 
logic of local populations in terms of land control8 . The very recent relative land 
scarcity has led to two different logics if not to a paradox: on one hand there is a 
reinforcement of the community vis-à-vis "external aggression" and , on the other, a 
reinforcement of individual strategies through the acquisition of new tree-crop 
plantations that secure land statute over time. 
One main consequence of this decrease in land availability is the shift from 
traditional extensive agriculture to more intensive cropping systems, the best 
example being the move from jungle rubber to more intensive monoculture or 
improved agro-forestry systems9. 
Conclusion 
There has been a progressive change in the social systems in the context of 
lndonesian economic policy, i.e. a policy of full expansion in the 1970s and the 
1980s, which was accelerated in the 1990s. However, the recent crisis raises the 
question of the limit of the flexibility of the system in particular if the acceleration 
exceeds the potential for " social change ". lt seems clear that in recent years ( 1995-
2000) full expansion of oil palm Estates showed the limit had been reached in some 
villages. The introduction of rubber has been very progressive over the years and 
sometimes did not disturb local farming systems. This is because it was introduced 
by means of the agro-forest system, which required very little labour and no capital at 
a time when land was not a limiting factor. The adoption of oil palm by smallholders 
was a good opportunity to increase their incarne and enable them to finance 
replacement of ageing jungle rubber with improved clonal rubber based on agro-
forestry systems or monoculture. On the other hand, conditions required for the 
development of oil palm, leading to the ultimate loss of 5.5 hectares for each 2 
hectares planted, is not an acceptable solution for local populations in the long term. 
The slow and progressive changes in social systems integrate the need for new 
technical systems and indeed the innovation process as well. Social systems, once 
stabilised - for example as early as in the second generation in a pioneer area - are 
often mirrors that reflect the constraints resulting from technical systems. Factors 
that induce change are thus the following: i) changes in overall needs and incarne, ii) 
8 Meantime, Estates faveur smallholders ' plantations and provide full credit and " ready to use " 
plantations in order to increase the quantity of rubber processed in their factories. 
9 Since 1994, smallholders have developed on their own improved clonai rubber based on agro-forestry 
systems, called " RAS sendiri ", or "endogeneous RAS" after SRAP tried to optimise these RAS 
(Rubber Agro-forestry System) through on-farm experimentation using a participatory approach in the 
are a. 
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a reduction in agricultural risk, iii) an increase in the total productivity of farming 
systems, iv) optimisation of labour and v) minimisation of capital investment. 
Since the beginning of the last century there has been no clear rupture between 
technical systems, technical change, leading to new constraints and social 
models. ln the 1990s, in spite of a rapid change in the economic context, flexibility 
and adaptation of social models enabled the integration of the most significant 
change, i.e., the passage of a Community-based society with communal rules based 
on the needs of shifting cultivation to an increasingly individualistic rural society 
where farmers' strategies are more individual. The main decisions are generally 
made at the farm level. 
Land and land tenure have changed due to the particular needs of tree-crops as well 
as the need for land securement for smallholders. Least, the fact that local land-
tenure is becoming more oriented to private property is irreversible. At the contrary, 
the current trend concerning land-use, and in particular the governmental 
concessions policy might be changed . 
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